The Constitution and the Guarantee of Freedom by Shotwell, James T.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
James Goold Cutler Lecture Conferences, Events, and Lectures
1942
The Constitution and the Guarantee of Freedom
James T. Shotwell
Copyright c 1942 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cutler
Repository Citation




Vol. 36, No.5 BULLETIN 
of 




Constitution and the Guarantee 
of Freedom 
An Address Delivered by 
JAMES T. SHOTWELL 
at 
The College of William and Mary 
in Virginia 
FOURTEENTH LECTURE UNDER 
THE JAMES GOOLD CUTLER TRUST 
WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA 
1942 
The Constitution and the Guarantee 
of Freedom 
. ". 
JAMES GOOLD CUTLER LECTURE 
By JAMES T. SHOTWELL 
Delivered at the College of William and Mary, February 9, 1942 
.". 
In this, the greatest crisis in the history of civilization, it is 
a sound instinct which carries our minds back across the 
century and a half of history to that day when the work of 
the Founding Fathers of the Republic was completed and the 
great experiment was definitely launched of creating a Con-
stitution that would both ensure effective government and 
safeguard the citizen against excess of power. Every new 
phase of the crisis draws us nearer in spirit to those pioneering 
thinkers who first set forth the fundamental principles upon 
which the institutions of our political life are based. It is not 
merely instinct, however,. which causes us to refresh our 
minds by a rereading of history; for the stubborn logic of 
events forces us into a situation which is fundamentally simi-
lar to that confronting the country at its birth. The long 
enumeration of acts of tyranny in the indictment of George 
III is more than paralleled by our indictment of our enemies 
today. At a time when liberty is trampled upon by the 
oppressor in more than half the world, the reminder of our 
heritage of freedom is especially valid and important. The 
fundamental issue of the present war is not the maintenance 
of the independence of t~e peoples of Continental Europe, 
nor of the British Empire, nor even the vast significance of 
the mastery of Asia; it is whether freedom itself can survive 
in nations which have cherished it more than life itself, or 
whether those who have never lived securely under its be-
nign regime will impose the contagion of their slavery upon 
the rest of the world. This is the issue of 1776 once more 
in a world-wide setting. The scene has shifted from the quiet 
precincts of historic Williamsburg to a world-wide debate 
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on the nature of government in which some of us think we 
can faintly discern the outlines of an international com-
munity of free nations looking forward with the same confi-
dence in the triumph of the fundamental principle of justice 
among nations, which is the basis of civil government at 
home. The debate at this hour is chiefly on the lips of guns 
and in the thrust of torpedoes on all the seven seas, but it is 
also a moral and spiritual conflict in which all of us play a 
part. For, at the same time as we are meeting attacks from 
without, we need to provide defense at home against any 
possible confusion concerning the legitimacy of our institu-
tions and our way of life. 
It was in fulfillment of this purpose of domestic clarifica-
tion that there was recently a nation-wide celebration of the 
I50th Anniversary of the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 
the Constitution. The exact terms of that celebration, how-
ever, left much to be desired from the standpoint of the his-
torian, however appealing it may have seemed to those who 
conceived of it as an emotional rededication to a great and 
national ideal. Listening to the voices that came over the 
air from Hollywood, one might think that the guarantee of 
freedom was an invention of our own, that we succeeded 
where other peoples suffered and failed, that however much 
the ideals had been illumined by prophets and teachers in the 
past, it had never been focussed into reality until set forth 
in the immortal phrasing of the Founding Fathers. It should 
be our first thought today to protest against this falsification 
of history; for no one would have protested more than Mason 
or Jefferson against the idea that the fundamental principles 
upon which the New Republic rested its case before the 
public opinion of the world were new and solely and purely 
American. The principles of government, designed to pro-
tect freedom, were not a sudden birth, like a full-armed 
Minerva from the head of Jove. The antecedents of the 
American experiment in government go back across the 
whole history of the Western world to those pioneers in 
political thinking, Plato and Aristotle, and to the stoic and 
Christian thinkers who built upon their work. Roman law 
and the scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages contrib-
uted to this heritage as well, and finally it was once more 
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brought out of the academic cloister by the writers of the 
period of the Renaissance and those following them to 
furnish the basis of the new State system of Europe in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
So far, however, we have been speaking of only one stream 
of influence upon the thought of Colonial America. But 
before we turn to analyze the nature of that contribution of 
Continental Europe to political theory, we must place over 
against it another and different pattern of politics, that which 
was drawn from the history of England. However much 
the English of the Middle Ages profited from Greece and 
Rome, the evolution of their political institutions was a thing 
apart from that of the Continent. In place of the generaliza-
tions of philosophy, they tended always to think in the 
homely terms of real life, and to build up the safeguards of 
freedom through the obscure but august process which was 
registered in the common law. 
The Founders of the American Republic were influenced 
by both these historic trends, the Continental and the English, 
as is clearly shown by an analysis of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence itself. The title deeds of the new nation are those 
granted to it by "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," 
a phrase in the opening paragraph of the Declaration, the 
full import of which most readers fail to note. For, in con-
trast with these eternal and immutable laws, the main prin-
ciples of which are summarized in the sentences which fol-
low, there is traced a detailed picture of civil law which con-
stitutes the picture of actual government under King George 
III. This series of political acts is clearly of a different char-
acter drawn from a different world of experience than the 
basic principles with which the misgovernment is contrasted. 
In short, the Declaration of Independence judges the govern-
ment of England on principles drawn from a Continental 
source. 
This is just the opposite of the procedure by which the 
English themselves set about redressing their own grievances 
against the Stuarts. James I,. a Scottish king, brought up 
under French influences, was trained in the Roman law and 
justified his theory of government upon it. His great legal 
opponent, Sir Edward Coke, was, on the contrary, the pro-
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tagonist of the common law, and drew his arsenal of argu-
ment from English experience. There was an advantage in the 
argument with the sovereign in his not being held down to 
a single set of principles like those which the king was fond 
of reciting from the Roman law in support of his claims of 
absolute kingship. In building thus upon the English past, 
Coke went so far as to strain historic truth in the support 
of freedom. Maitland's remark that Coke "invented Magna 
Charta" is but another way of saying that he used it to the 
full and for perhaps a little more than it was worth. For it 
was a mighty buttress for the glorification of the common 
law. Yet, while refusing to follow the lead of the Roman 
jurists, he fell back upon much the same method in his insis-
tence upon a fundamental law superior to parliamentary 
statutes, an argument not without influence upon American 
revolutionary opinion. 
Now it is a striking fact that the opposition to George III 
in the Declaration of Independence was not based upon any 
such reasoning as that of Coke, for Jefferson fell back upon 
the method of King James and challenged the existing gov-
ernment of England on the basis of its violation of certain 
abstract rights with which, according to the Declaration, all 
men are endowed by their Creator. This contrast of the 
initial statement of the American Revolution, with that which 
laid the groundwork fot; the Civil War and the Revolution of 
1689 in England, seems to have escaped attention, so far as 
I know, and it is certainly an interesting conjecture as to 
why this should have been the case. I think the answer may 
perhaps lie in the fact that when the experience of the English 
Revolution came to be summed up after it was all over, the 
fundamental principles of the law of nature which were then 
adduced, were very different from the principles which King 
James drew from the Roman law. James could fall back 
upon the precepts of the late Imperial period of Roman his-
tory, which emphasized the power and sovereignty of a 
Divine ruler. By the time John Locke wrote his "Two 
Treatises on Civil Government," it was not to the late Roman 
period that the political philosophers were looking but to the 
period of the Republic and the Early Empire, in which the 
rights of man were the chief concern of both philosophers 
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and jurists, and there was a place for Freedom in the scheme 
of eternal things. 
It is almost impossible for us today to realize how heavy 
was the weight of antique learning upon the thought of the 
sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The forma-
tive period of modern history was dominated to a large ex-
tent by antique models. In its first phase this played into 
the hands of absolutism and the age of despots was the result. 
The theory of the Divine right of kings drew support, not 
merely from the precepts of the late Roman Empire, but even 
more from the Old Testament and that ceremony which 
amounted to almost an eighth sacrament, the anointing and 
the coronation of the King. Royalty was thus exalted until 
it claimed to be the whole body politic, "L'etat, c'est moi." 
This conception, destroyed in England in the seventeenth 
century, and in France in the Revolution which followed our 
own, was acted upon by rulers as enlightened as Frederick 
the Great. How was it that the revolutionary theory which 
ultimately supplanted it, of the sovereignty of the people, 
won its way to victory? The answer to this question is that 
the opponents of absolute monarchy found an even richer 
arsenal in the classical authors than in the protagonists of 
kingship. -
At the risk of repetition, let us trace this prehistory of the 
Bill of Rights a little more definitely. We begin with Rich-
ard Hooker, "the judicious Hooker," as Locke repeatedly 
refers to him. Hooker's "Ecclesiastical Polity," published in 
1593, was designed as an argument against the Puritans and 
for the Church as established by Elizabeth, and the applica-
tion of that argument to civil polity was only incidental. 
Nevertheless, falling. back upon the concept of the law of 
nature as the ' embodiment of reason, he reached the conclu-
sion that laws must harmonize with this fundamental test and 
be upheld so long as they are fitted to that end. In the effort 
to show the Puritans that they were wrong in their objection 
to what the majority desired, he argued that reason is subject 
to change with circumstances, and calls for adjustment to 
realities. The Puritans had fallen back upon Revelation, but 
that, said Hooker, is a matter of faith, whereas Reason is the 
guide for mankind in its secular activities. Society itself is a 
product of the law of nature because, in the pursuit of hap-
piness (the phrase had not yet acquired currency) the inter-
play of interests lead men to agree upon some form of gov-
ernment to harmonize their varying desires. There is nothing 
new in all of this, for it is the old debate familiar to Cicero, 
and to the scholastics. But it leads also to the fundamental 
thought which was crystallized by Rousseau, that of a social 
compact as the basis of society. The wording, however, is 
very unlike Rousseau. Let me quote one sentence: 
. . . By the natural law whereunto God hath made all 
subject, the lawful power of making laws to command 
whole politic societies of men belongethso properly 
unto the same entire societies, that for any prince or 
potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise 
the same of himself, and not either by express commis-
sion immediately and personally received from God, or 
else by authority derived at the first from their consent 
upon whose persons they impose the laws, it is no bet-
ter than mere tyranny. 
Thus Hooker's contribution to English political thought 
leads to the conclusion that a test of the validity of laws is the 
consent of the governed. It is a para~ox which was bound 
to be noticed, that in this way, while arguing for the support 
of the Tudor Queen in her ecclesiastical policy, Hooker 
enunciated a theory quite at variance with the earlier trend 
of Tudor despotism. His influence, however, was limited 
by the fact that he was writing a treatise against the Puritans, 
and they, in their struggle for power, found support in the 
more practical mind of Coke. The real battle against the 
Stuarts was to be fought out on more definitely English terms. 
When the battle was over, John Locke summed up the con-
sequences in his "Two Treatises of Government," published 
in August, 1689, some six months after the Declaration of 
Rights forced upon William and Mary on their accession to 
the throne. That document began by reciting Hooker's 
theory of a contractual basis for the Constitution of England. 
At this point, we may pause to remark that it is perhaps a 
fortunate thing for the English that they never codified their 
Constitution into a single written document, for they might 
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have found it difficult to include in it the contractual basis of 
the sovereignty of William and Mary along with the declara-
tion of a King by the Grace of God. The advantage of not 
having codified their texts is that there can be a shifting 
emphasis upon those particular elements in the body of pre-
cedent and statute through which the British government 
works. In short, seventeenth century England actually 
worked out in its political history that harmony between the 
law of nature and civil law which Hooker had made the basis 
of his argument a century before. 
This may seem an unduly long historical introduction to 
the guarantee of freedom in our Constitution, but we have 
only now reached the real bridge between English and 
American thought, for it was John Locke who was the men-
tor and George Mason the author of the Bill of Rights in 
the Constitution of Virginia, and we have not even touched 
as yet upon the contribution of Montesquieu, whose scheme 
of government would make government itself a check upon 
the undue extension of its powers. There would, of course, 
be a certain justification in analyzing Locke's political philos-
ophy in some detail at this point because he was the man who 
most influenced American political thinking in the period of 
the Revolution. As this has often been done, however, we 
shall content ourselves with an attempt to answer the question 
why it was that the Whig philosophy of social contract 
which he elucidated triumphed so completely in the England 
of 1689 and in the thought of the Founding Fathers. 
The answer to this is, I believe, to be chiefly found in the 
economic history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
which was the period of the Commercial Revolution. The 
treasure that was captured by the freebooters who plundered 
the galleons of Spain was not left in the hands of rulers to 
accumulate in hoards for the payment of soldiery or the ex-
travagance of courts. The seamen of the northern nations 
were backed by businessmen who speedily learned how to 
use capital in productive enterprise. Merchant adventurers, 
they introduced into the economic life of northern Europe a 
different sense of property from that which concentrated 
upon territorial holdings. Fluid property to the extent of 
these new millions in gold and silver coins had never been 
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known in history before. It followed, therefore, that any 
social contract in the political . framework of government 
which would be valid for England or the Netherlands, would 
have to provide safeguards for capitalistic property if the 
new merchant and moneyed class was to maintain its place 
within the state. ' 
On the other hand, the King had a greater need for money 
than ever before because of the increased cost of administra-
tion due to the inflationary effect of the influx of gold and 
silver, which produced the first revolution in prices in the 
history of Europe. The issue between the Stuart Kings and 
the Commoners of England was thus largely conditioned by 
the Commercial Revolution; it was not only personal liberty 
but money. The control of the purse had become very 
definitely the test of political power. The argument, how-
ever, by which Royalty was met was based upon English 
precedent. James I, trained in Roman law, met the claims of 
the English jurists by reiterating the precepts of late Roman 
law in which the will of the monarch was recognized as 
supreme. Over against this basic citation in support of 
Divine Right, Coke, as McKechnie puts it, "read into Magna 
Carta the entire body of the common law of the seventeenth 
century, of which he was admittedly a master," and did it so 
effectively that it assumed substantia.1ly the character of a 
statement of natural law. Thus he and Hooker were ap-
proaching from opposite angles that theory of human rights 
which had played so large a part in the theory of the stoics. 
The law of nature could evidently be reached by the experi-
mental processes of English justice as well as by the philo-
sophic deductions of Aristotle. 
Of these two streams of history, the English and the Con-
tinental, the latter nms with limpid current between banks 
that have been opened and made straight by the logic of legal 
engineering; while the former meanders obscurely and at 
times is almost lost to view as it sinks into the soil of English 
life. But the green meadows of the common law, which it 
refreshes, spreading out by village and countryside, are a 
more vital symbol of freedom than the prouder creations 
of the Roman jurists at the courts of rulers. Let us take two 
examples of this vitality. Our Bill of Rights of 1791 thunders 
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"nor shall any person be deprived of life" liberty or property 
without due process of law." These very words, clad in the 
quaint Norman French of 13Sf, were enacted by the Parlia-
ment of Westminster in the twenty-eighth year of Edward 
III, six years after the battle of Crecy.1 The gap between 
the two texts is four hundred and thirty-seven years, but even 
an old equity draughtsman might well agree that this is the 
only gap there is. Another example is our constitutional right 
of the freedom of speech. This made no change whatever in 
the rights of free speech which Englishmen were then enjoy-
ing. It is the rights of free speech, as defined by the common 
law, which cannot be abridged.2 
Let us turn now from legal to political history. Alongside 
the common law principle of habeas corpus, stood the demand 
that there should not be taxation without representation. The 
two were combined in that most signal exercise of the right 
of petition ever made, the Petition of Right of 1628, which, 
by the King's signature became law. .England was saved 
from becoming a land where the King could imprison on 
lettres de cachet such as filled the Bastile, and from the levy 
of arbitrary taxes. In the subsequent Civil War the free 
rights of Englishmen to dispose of both person and property 
were sealed in blood; but, as the forces engaged in the conflict 
were ranged under banners of political faith, it was the pro-
tection of property which took precedence over personal 
liberty, as the very names of the opposing forces indicate. 
It was a war of Parliament against the King; not of law courts 
against despotism, although the two principles were united in 
their fundamental opposition to rule by Divine Right. The 
contrast with what happened in France is interesting at this 
point; for there it was the law courts which led in the civil 
1 The text of this statute reads as follows: "que nul home ne soit oste de 
terre ne de tenement ne pris nemprisone ne desherite ne mis a mon saunz 
estre mesne en response par dues proces de lei." Behind this of course lies 
the classic phrase in Anicle 39 of Magna Carta: "No freeman shall be 
captured or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way 
destroyed, nor will we go against him or send against him, except by the 
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." 
2 Those rights were limited as to treason, conspiracy, libel and slander; tree 
speech was secured against those limitations by the privileged nature of 
communications made in the Confessional, to the physician, and between 
lawyer and client. ' 
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disturbances ot the Fronde. In England in the seventeenth 
century, the propertied class went beyond juristic to political 
liberty as th~ fundamental principle of their Constitution. 
When we come to think about it, there is nothing strange 
in the fact that the Revolution which brought the middle 
class to power should put the protection of property to the 
forefront. But it was a tour de force for the English philos-
ophers of that period to read this fundamental interest of 
theirs into the law of nature so completely as to make the 
identification seem axiomatic. It is true that there was a 
hint of the possibilities in Greek and Roman literature, but 
those possibilities were not developed and applied to the 
conditions of the modern world until Locke wrote his famous 
Treatises on Civil Government. Perhaps the essence of his 
philosophy is best summed up in the following sentences: 
"The great and chief need of men uniting into common-
wealths and putting themselves under gov~rnment is the pres-
ervation of their property, to which in ' the state of nature 
there are many things wanting," and that the commonwealth 
must be so organized that "the supreme power . cannot take 
from any man any part of his property without his own con-
sent." This quotation, however, should not be left standing 
by itself, for by property Locke said that he meant "that 
property which men have in their persons as well as goods." 
So far we have been dealing with the essential English sit-
uation with which Locke's Treatises were fundamentally con-
cerned. Nevertheless, his Treatises on Civil Government 
were not argued on the basis of English precedent but were 
cast in the mold of natural law. It was perhaps chiefly owing 
to this fortunate circumstance that they became universal in 
application and influenced deeply not only the thought of 
Americans but the philosophers of France, thus furnishing 
inspiration for two great currents of revolution. 
Before we leave the old world for the new, however, there 
is an interesting parallel to be drawn between the achievement 
of freedom in the political and economic spheres. The year 
1776 was the date of the publication of Adam Smith's Wealth 
of Nations, also a document of freedom. In it, the new capi-
talism of the Commercial Revolution registered its protest 
against the rigidity of government control. Although the 
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movement of economic forces is often slower and less evident 
than that of politics, it is also a fundamental expression of 
human society. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth 
century that the doctrine of freer trade broke down the bar-
riers of mercantilism throughout Europe. Had that liber-
ating movement happened a century earlier, it would have 
produced an entirely different history of the modern world. 
This hurried sketch of the European background of Colo-
nial thinking on political matters, slight and imperfect as it is, 
should be kept in mind as we turn to the ways in which Eng-
lish experience and antique precept were fused into the per-
manent instruments of government of the New Republic. 
The first of these to be drawn up was that which took shape 
here in Williamsburg in June, 1776, the Constitution of the 
State of Virginia. As everyone knows, it preceded the Dec-
laration of Independence, although by only a short space of 
time. As we read the text of the Bill of Rights drafted by 
George Mason, and inserted in this pioneer document of the 
liberties of America, we see at once how natural such a 
statement would be from so close a student of Locke. "All 
men are created equally free and independent and have cer-
tain inherent natural rights of which they cannot by any 
Compact deprive or divest their posterity; among which are 
the enjoyment of Life and Liberty, with the Means of ac-
quiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining 
happiness and safety." The second article continues the same 
theme in the same universal terms, "that all Power is by God 
and Nature,· vested, and consequently derived from the peo-
ple; that magistrates are their Trustees and Servants and at all 
times amenable to them." 
Bills of Rights, such as that to which these ringing sentences 
furnish the prelude, were incorporated in the constitutions 
of seven of the revolting colonies. This undoubtedly 
was not due to any tendency to copy the formulations of 
Virginia, but to a widespread trend in ; colonial thinking of 
the same ideas as those which emanated from Mason and his 
associates. Later on, when the substance of this Bill of Rights 
·The phrase "by God and Nature" of Mason's draft was stricken out of 
the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which, it should be said,- was not 
strictly a part of the Constitution. 
was incorporated in the Federal Constitution, this action by 
the various States was lost sight of except to the eye of the 
researching historian. 
Nevertheless, it is a peculiar fact that it was one of the 
influences of the American Revolution upon that of France 
which left a definite trace for the historian. The Convention 
which was drawing up the Constitution of the French Re-
public ordered a translation to be made of the Constitution 
of Virginia, thus having at hand for comparison with the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen .the Vir-
ginian Bill of Rights of George Mason. It is of much greater 
interest to us, however, to compare that document with the 
Declaration of Independence drafted by a different hand but 
drawn from the same creative source whose fountain-head 
was the College of William and Mary. 
Mason's enumeration of "inherent natural rights" is longer 
but more precise. The great phrase of the Declaration, "Life, 
Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness," has become so 'much 
a part of American history that we seldom pause to think of 
the swift sweep of the trilogy as needing any further defini-
tion. Yet, the longer phrase of Mason's text is a more careful 
statement, if less effective, than the headlining which Jeffer-
son gave to it. The inherent "natural Rights" which Mason 
enumerated, are enjoyment of Life and Liberty, not Life it-
self, nor even Liberty. And parallel with this is the oppor-
tunity for acquiring and possessing property, enabling the cit-
izen to pursue and obtain happiness and safety. Here we 
have Locke's Treatise on Government paraphrased in a single 
clause, but with a significant accent upon a phrase lacking in 
the Treatise on Government, "the pursuit of happiness." 
Locke was no Puritan to whom- this world was merely a 
stern school fitting the soul for the life to come by an ~,ustere 
denial of present enjoyments. On the contrary, he empha-
sized the right which men have "to enjoy their goods and 
possessions" as a fundamental condition of organized society. 
But this ideal of the good life suffered a sea-change when 
Mason and Jefferson gave it voice in the New World; it was 
not the possession but the pursuit of happiness which was set 
before the American people as the thing to be desired. Never 
was prevision more justified, for it is surely the peculiar qual-
[ 14] 
ity of American life that it does find happiness in the pursuit 
of it. Forever following its star, it is forever stirred with a 
sense of aspiration and endeavor. Thus Jefferson, by the 
deft use of this single phrase, added a whole new province to 
the field of natural law, carrying it over from the static world 
of ancient times and the Middle Ages to that of the tumultous 
pressures of today. 
One wonders just what the New England Puritans thought 
of this pursuit of happiness as an ideal for America. It must 
have sounded strange in the ears of those for whom life in 
this world was but a preparation for that in the world to 
come. It is certainly an added reason for rejoicing that the 
Declaration of Independence was turned over to be written 
by a Virginian, because otherwise it is doubtful if it would 
ever have cheered, as it has, the prospect of so many genera-
tions. Whether George Mason's Cavalier ancestry predis-
posed him toward the acceptance of this genial idea of pur-
suing happiness while acquiring and possessing property, or 
whether he was simply giving homely expression to the more 
sober thought of Aristotle that the ultimate end of society 
was the furtherance of the good life, is a point which can 
never be settled. It has been surmised that perhaps the influ-
ences of the Swiss writer Burlamaqui, an author exceedingly 
popular in America at that time, was responsible for the link-
ing of the ideas of happiness with property. Although almost 
forgotten now, he was the most widely read of the political 
theorists of that time. His work was, a textbook in the classes 
of William and Mary, and was used by George Wythe, who 
had so great an influence upon the intellectual development 
of Jefferson. The evidence of Jefferson's Commonplace 
Book, however,. seems to point to James Wilson as the me-
dium through which the influence of Burlamaqui's thought 
was transmitted. However this may be, the fact remains that 
Mason's reference to property disappeared from the Declara-
tion of Independence. 
We are now at last ready to turn to the announced subject 
of this lecture, "The Constitution of the United States and 
the Safeguards of Freedom Contained in It." The history of 
the formation of the Constitution is too well known for me 
to do more than point to one or two of the more significant 
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items ill It. It was built on the shifting sands of discord and 
discouragement. For a time, the winning of independence 
seemed to have burnt out men's enthusiasms for the eternal 
verities. Divided north and south and in economic interests, 
it appeared to many who had stood foremost in the fight 
against the external enemy that the fruits of victory were 
turning to ashes in their mouths. This is, of course, the situ-
ation which is almost sure to arise after any war in which the 
underlying differences of allied communities or states have 
been overcome or forgotten during the period of fighting but 
which come to the fore after the war is over. The ,Pritical 
period of American history, that which lay between the close 
of the War of Independence and the framing of the Constitu-
tion, was repeated in a sense in the years which followed after 
the First World War when partisanship and, then later, indif-
ference 'in the American body politic frustrated the possibil-
ities which lay in that first sketch of a Constitution for the 
world, Woodrow Wilson's Covenant of the League of Na-
tions. Future historians will undoubtedly regard the years 
which lay between the two world wars as at least equally 
fateful for the liberties of this country as that critical period 
at the beginning of its history. It is to be hoped that the 
close of the present world war will find us better prepared, 
as we shall be more, matured in political experience. And yet 
the . problem of today is so much more difficult than that 
which confronted the Founding Fathers that we have at 
least no room for undue optimism at the present time. 
There Is nothing invidous in the fact, which Professor 
Beard was the first to emphasize, that it was primarily the 
concern for property rights which brought about the call for 
the Convention which met in Philadelphia in 1787. There 
was evelY reason for concern. Property was imperiled both 
by populist state legislation and the fear of widespread pop-
ular uprisings. But the only voice raised in the Convention in 
sincere concern for the rights of personal liberty was that of 
George Mason, who proposed that a bill enumerating the in-
alienable rights of the people, like that of his Virginia Declara-
tion of Rights, should be inserted in the Constitution. When 
Gerry moved that a committee be appointed to draw up such 
a declaration, the Convention voted unanimously, ten . to 
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nothing, against it. Jefferson, who was absent as Minister to 
France, showed his concern over this drift of affairs. When 
Madison sent him a copy of the Constitution, he wrote back 
that "a Bill of Rights is what the people are entitled to against 
every government on earth, general or particular, and what 
no just government should refuse, or rest on inferences." 
The argument of the Federalists, on the other hand, was that 
a strong government would overcome the defect of a lack of 
specific guarantees of liberty by "that prompt and salutary 
execution of the laws which enters into the very definition of 
good government." It was not until the 84th number of the 
Federalist, however, that they came squarely upon the issue 
stating "that the Constitution is itself in every rational sense 
and to every useful purpose A BILL OF RIGHTS," in the same 
way as "the several bills of rights in Great Britain form its 
constitution." The heavy artillery of the Federalists; how-
ever, could not prevail against the deep feeling of the people 
that a formal guarantee was called for against the possible 
development of tyranny in the newly-formed government. 
This protest was not what Hamilton would have called "the 
voice of rabble." Its most powerful backer was still George 
Mason, to whom Jefferson in h,is old age paid tribute as one 
of the wisest among the statesmen of his time. Madison, ap-
parently won over by the arguments of his Virginian friends, 
changed his Federalist standpoint for that of Mason, and 
finally on June 8, 1789, the Father of the Constitution rose in 
Congress to propose the first Ten Amendments to the great 
document which had been so largely his creation. 
It is not my purpose to attempt to trace here the history of 
the Bill of Rights throughout-the nineteenth century. That 
is a task for the specialist in the history of law. It is not a 
theme which has played any large part in American history 
as taught in the schools. Even in recent years the widely 
read volume on "The Rise of American Civilization," by 
Charles and Mary Beard, while giving a good account of the 
making of the Constitution itself, passes over the first Ten 
Amendments without any mention of the Bill of Rights con-
tained in them. Indeed, the term "Bill of Rights" does not 
appear in the Index of that volume. The explanation for this 
is perhaps partly to be found in the fact that there was 
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another safeguard of freedom, both of person and of prop-
erty, in the Constitution, provided in the independence of 
the judiciary. This opens an entirely different prospect from 
that which we have been looking at hitherto. The architect 
of that tripartite edifice of government which rests upon a 
separation of the Powers was not John Locke, but Montes-
quieu. The manual of the French jurist which was destined 
to play so great a part in our history, "The Spirit of Laws," 
was primarily drawn from a study of the way in which the 
Romans of the Republican period had broken up the universal 
powers of Kingship into the appropriate divisions of govern-
ment with especial reference to the evolution 6f Roman law. 
Later on Montesquieu thought he discovered in the English 
Constitution a similar separation of the powers. This was 
not Locke's point of view because he regarded the legislature 
as supreme. Nevertheless, the principle of the independence 
of the English judiciary as a bulwark against the extension of 
royal prerogative was one of the decisive gains of the English 
Revolution. There was therefore both French and English 
precedent behind the creation of a supreme court, the mem-
bers of which were appointed for life, although it was left for 
John Marshall, by a broad interpretation of the Constitution, 
to give that court the place which it has come to occupy, 
not only in juristic theory but in the public opinion of the 
country. The extent to which the court had become "a pal-
ladium of liberty" in popular opinion was shown in the com-
plete overthrow of a recent Executive effort to weaken it. 
It was upon this independence of the judiciary that the 
great teacher of American Constitutional Law of the nine-
teenth century, Professor Burgess, based his test of govern-
ment. A soldier of the Northern army in the war between 
the states and then a student of those German political phil-
osophers who, following Hegel, exalted the state as the em-
bodiment of absolute sovereignty, he yet found it essential to 
place a limitation upon the sphere of government so that it 
shoul~ not curtail the sphere of liberty. Time and again he 
emphasized both in his writings and in his lectures the peculiar 
merit of the American Constitution in having set up a judi-
ciary which, because it was capable of checking both the 
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other branches of government, exalted liberty above the proc-
esses of state action. 
This explains why Professor Burgess never referred to the 
Bill of Rights by that name but always spoke of it as the 
First Ten Amendments to the Constitution. There was, how-
ever, another reason for this perspective. It was his extreme 
opposition to the doctrine of states' rights, an opposition 
which led him to interpret the middle period of American 
history, that preceding the War between the States, as a time 
when the fundamental principles of American unity, as they 
had been envisaged by Hamilton and applied even by Jeffer-
son and Jackson, were lost sight of in the years following the 
Missouri Compromise. According to his theory of American 
history, the country recovered its title deeds only in the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
Through its application by the Supreme Court to limit the 
right of the States to engage in social experiments, this 
Amendment to the Constitution, originally conceived to em-
body the victory of the political theories of the north, be-
came, by a strange turn in history something quite different 
from what it was designed to be. Historically, the Four-
teenth Amendment fits in between the Thirteenth and Fif-
teenth, emphasizing as it does the supremacy of the union. 
But the guarantee which it offers to all citizens is linked so 
definitely with the Federal system as to carry over into that 
system the elements of the Bill of Rights which were origi-
nally linked with states' rights theory. The Fourteenth 
Amendment does not put the limitation upon Congress, as 
was the case in the First Amendment, but upon the legisla-
tures of the states. "No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws." The advantage of this text was that it linked 
the principles of the Bill of Rights with the Federal judiciary 
and thus, at last, seemed to have united the two currents 
which began with Mason and Jefferson, on, the one hand, 
and Hamilton and his Federalist associates on the other. 
The shape in which problems appear to each new genera-
l 19] 
tion is ever changing. The fundamental principles by which 
those problems must be tested remain the same but need to be 
restated from age to age in terms of the present. As this 
country filled up and its last frontiers were reached, new 
questions of social justice arose to challenge the conscience of 
men. The Bill of Rights, which had been a revolutionary 
product, now showed, in its new formulation in the Four-
teenth Amendment, that it had also a conservative aspect. 
The question which arose therefore and which even yet is 
by no means settled was whether it would be possible to 
retain those liberties for which our ancestors had mutually 
pledged their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor, and 
at the same time to provide for the economically submerged 
third of our nation the material basis without which, as 
George Mason may have meant to show in linking it with 
property, the pursuit of happiness is but an illusion. 
And now finally we come to the issue of freedom in the 
world today. This is the supreme challenge of the Second 
World War. Never in all history has there been such a 
revolutionary movement as that which finds its chief and 
strongest champion in the country from which Professor 
Burgess drew his theory of government over half a century 
ago, Germany. Fascist Italy nurtures no such fanaticism as 
the Germans have shown themselves capable of. The other 
Axis power, however, Japan, outdoes Germany in its rigidity 
of thought, if not in the cruelty of its suppression of opposi-
tion. It was but natural that the United States should find 
it hard to believe the thoroughgoing denial of freedom which 
the forces of the Axis are fighting to impose upon the world, 
but now we have at last learned the truth of Wilson's noble 
phrase, and have realized that there is no safety for our free-
dom unless we have a whole world safe for democracy. 
It was therefore but natural that occasion should have been 
taken to reestablish the Bill of Rights in the public mind of 
this country. The more recent celebration of the I 50th Anni-
versary of its adoption was referred to earlier. It is clear that 
this summary of the safeguards of freedom has now become 
more a political doctrine thana purely legal one. So far as 
its legal history is concerned, we know now how to apply it in 
our domestic life, conscious of the fact that eternal vigilance is 
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the price which we must pay for its maintenance and 
strengthening. But in the political field we have not only to 
defeat the enemy that threatens our institutions and our way 
of life, but we have to create new institutions and adjust our 
way of life to a world-wide scene. This is the greatest task 
that has ever confronted the intelligence of mankind, for the 
New Federalism, as it has been called, which is destined some 
day to include the whole civilized world, is as yet only a 
dream and an inspiration, for which even the most matured 
in political experience are ill prepared. 
Happily, the making of the Constitution of the United 
States provides a clue as to the basic thought which must 
underlie the new law of nations, for no one has yet devised 
any adequate substitute for that political philosophy which 
springs from the pioneering thought of the Greek philoso-
phers, and which was the inspiration of Locke, of Mason, 
and of Jefferson. Natural law, or better still, the law of na-
ture, is the only sound basis upon which to build the structure 
of government between nations as well as within a nation. 
The safeguard of freedom lies in the erection of those insti-
tutions which ensure justice. And justice is not what each 
sovereign claims for itself, but what is sound and healthful 
practice for society. The only way to ensure peace is to 
create the substitutes for war, without which there can be 
no guarantee of freedom anywhere in the world. 
This, I venture to say, is the way in which the ultimate issue 
of the Second World War will have to be faced. It is funda-
mentally the same as that which was first formulated for the 
New World by gentlemen of Virginia, only a few steps away 
from where I stand. 
